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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

Nature Of The Case
This appeal asks whether the district court clearly erred when establishing the reasonable

value of real property once owned by Appellants Lake Cascade Airpark, LLC ("Lake Cascade
Airpark") and Donald and Candace Miller (the "Millers"). 1 Respondent Northwest Farm Credit
Services ("NFCS") brought a foreclosure action against Appellants and sought a deficiency
judgment based on its appraisal that found the property was no longer developable, was valuable
only as agricultural grazing land, and was worth $4,001 per acre or $1,335,000. Finding that
appraisal credible, the district court agreed the property only has value as agricultural land.
While so, the district court found the appraisal "a bit on the low side" and, without further
explanation, established the propeliy's reasonable value as $1,501,500 or $4,500 per acre.
Resting as it does on NFCS's appraisal, the district court's finding that the property
should be valued only as agricultural land was clearly erroneous. Substantial evidence showed
the property is uniquely situated for development as a wetland mitigation bank authorized under
the Clean Water Act and that sellable credits from the bank would have great value in Idahowell in excess of $4,500 per acre. By failing to take that evidence into account, the district court
accepted and relied on assumptions made by NFCS regarding the feasibility of a wetland
mitigation bank on the property, and thus the value of the property, that were plainly wrong.
Because the district court clearly erred when it found the property is valuable only as agricultural

Lake Cascade Airpark and the Millers are, at times, referred to collectively as
"Appellants."
1
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land, this COUli must reverse the finding that the property is valued at no more than $4,500 per
acre or $1,501,500.
Course Of Proceedings

B.

On February 6, 2012, NFCS filed a complaint to foreclose real estate mortgages against
2

Lake Cascade Airpark, the Millers, and David and Karen Buich (the "Buichs"). R.9-37. The
complaint sought to hold each defendant in default on two loan agreements, to foreclose the
mortgages securing those loans, and the entry of a deficiency judgment. R. 17-19. Appellants
answered, R. 38-42, as did the Buichs, R. 43-46. On August 27,2012, the district court entered
partial summary judgment in favor of NFCS, finding Appellants and the Buichs were in default
on the loans and that NFCS was entitled to foreclose on the mortgages. R. 51-53. The district
court also found that genuine issues of material fact existed with respect to the amount due and
owing on the loans and the reasonable value of the mortgaged property. R. 52. The district court
thus denied summary judgment on those issues. Id.
On September 25,2012, the two remaining issues were tried to the district court. The
Buichs did not participate, having stipulated to the entry of a default judgment against them. R.
59; Tr. 10:23-11 :21. At trial, there was also no dispute on the amounts owed on the loans. The
following day, the district court entered its Partial Findings and Conclusions pursuant to Idaho R.

In this brief, the Clerk's Record on Appeal is cited as "R." and the transcript from the
September 25, 2012 trial is cited as "Tr." The exhibits admitted at the trial are cited as "Ex."
Because the trial exhibits are compiled and numbered sequentially, the page number of the
compilation is cited, as opposed to the page number of the exhibit itself. For instance, "Ex. (H)
at 37" refers to Exhibit H and page 37 of the compilation of exhibits, not page 37 of Exhibit H.
2

-274518025.60043308·00005

Civ. P. 52(a). R. 58-65. The district court found Appellants and the Buichs owed a total of
$3,532,277.04, with interest accruing at a total daily rate of$859.66. R.6l. The district court
also found that the mortgaged property had a "reasonable or fair market value of $4,500 per acre
or $1,501,335.00, rounded to $1,501,500.00, as of September 25, 2012." R.64.
On November 2,2012, the district court entered a Decree of Foreclosure and Order of
Sale. R. 66-69. Thereafter Appellants moved to amend the district court's Partial Findings and
Conclusions pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) and for a new trial pursuant to Idaho R.
Civ. P. 59(a)(6). R. 70-7l. The district court heard and denied those motions. R. 393-403.
After purchasing the property at a sheriff s sale, NFCS moved for the entry of a deficiency
judgment. See R. 7. On March 19,2013, the district court entered a Judgment in favor ofNFCS,
establishing the deficiency owed by Appellants and the Buichs as $2,105,986.16, plus interest.
R. 412-l3. Appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on April 29, 20 l3. R. 416-19.
C.

Statement Of Facts
1.

Lake Cascade Airpark Acquired The Subject Property Because Of Its
Proximity To Cascade Airstrip And Developmental Potential.

In 2004, the Millers formed Lake Cascade Airpark with the Buichs for the purpose of
acquiring real property in Valley County, Idaho, on and around the Cascade Airstrip. Tr. 86:2287:2,90:1-12. That same year, Lake Cascade Airpark purchased a large parcel of property
directly adjacent to the airstrip. See Tr. 89: l3-90: 12. The property-which is the subject of this
appeal-sits to the north of the town of Cascade and south of Donnelly, just to the east of

"

- J -

74518025.60043308-00005

Cascade Reservoir. 3 See Ex. (H) at 31,36,53. It totals 333.63 acres and is irrigated pasture
land. Ex. (H) at 31,36. The property is zoned Multiple Use-Agriculture, which allows for single
family dwellings and agricultural uses. Tr. 35:25-36:16; Ex. (H) at 37,39.
Lying between the subject property and the eastern shore of Cascade Reservoir is 200
acres of reserve interest deed lands-which is commonly referred to as a permanent agricultural
easement-also held by Lake Cascade Airpark. Tr. 82:2-21, 84: 1-7. The Cascade Airstrip sits
on the 200-acre agricultural easement. Tr. 82:2-21. It is a recreational airstrip that is currently
inactive. Tr. 81:20-82:1,112:1-16. The proximity of the Cascade Airstrip and the
developmental potential of lands adjacent to the airstrip led Lake Cascade Airpark to purchase
the subject property. Tr. 89:13-20,90:13-91:1. Through Lake Cascade Airpark, the Millers and
the Buichs planned to develop the west side of the property, the land closest to the airstrip, into
an airpark with a residential unit per two acres, consistent with its zoning. Tr. 90: 13-91:1,91 :2394:22; see also Ex. (2) at 78, 86.

2.

The Subject Property Is Also Uniquely Suited For Development As A
Wetland Mitigation Bank Under The Clean Water Act.

The subject property also has other attributes: over 200 acres comprising the east side of
the property is uniquely suited for development as a wetland mitigation bank. Tr. 91:7-16,
125:5-126:5, 127:6-17; see also Ex. (2) at 78. In 2006, the Idaho Transportation Department
("ITD") approached Lake Cascade Airpark regarding the property and its potential as a wetland

Cascade Reservoir is also known as Lake Cascade, which is its common and official
name. For the sake of clarity, it is referenced in this brief as "Cascade Reservoir."
3
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mitigation bank under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § l301, et seq. Tr. 95:23-61:1,97:2198:5. The Clean Water Act requires compensatory mitigation for the purpose of offsetting
impacts to the waters of the United States authorized under Section 404 of the statute, 33 U.s.C.
§ 1344. See Tr. 121:1-122:22; see also 40 C.F.R. pt. 230, subpt. J; 33 C.F.R. pt. 332. One way

Section 404 permittees, such as ITD, can meet that requirement is purchasing mitigation credits
from a wetland mitigation bank. Tr. 121:20-122:6; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.93(b)(2), 230.98;
33 C.F.R. §§ 332.3(b)(2), 332.8.
A wetland mitigation bank is a site where wetlands are established, restored, enhanced, or
preserved. 40 C.F.R. § 230.92 (defining "mitigation bank"); 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (same); see also
Tr. 121:1-122:22. Mitigation banks are created with the approval of the Army Corps of
Engineers and the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"). Tr. 121: 1-11; 40
C.F.R. § 230.98; 33 C.F.R. § 332.8. Once established, credits from the bank are sold to Section
404 permittees within distinct service areas, in this case within the Payette River, Weiser River,
and Boise River drainages. 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.93(b)(2), 230.98; 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.3(b)(2), 332.8;
Tr. 101:6-14, l34:5-12. Mitigation credits are very valuable. The evidence at trial showed that
lTD recently purchased three to four acres' worth of emergent wetlands for approximately
$25,000 per tenth of an acre. Tr. 130:18-131 :5. Also, the City of Boise had purchased credits
for $4.50 per square foot or approximately $180,000 per acre. Tr. 106: 17-107:20. Although
fairly new, the market for mitigation credits already exists in Idaho. Tr. 131 :6-13, l34:5-16.
After meeting with agency stakeholders, Lake Cascade Airpark commissioned feasibility
studies and prepared a prospectus, which is the first level of approval for banking wetland
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mitigation credits. Tr. 98:6-15,101:6-102:1,123:10-19; 40 C.F.R. § 230.98(d)(2); 33 C.F.R. §
332.8(d)(2). As part of those efforts, Lake Cascade Airpark hired James Fronk, among others, to
investigate the property and determine whether it met the criteria for a wetland mitigation bank.
Tr. 123: 10-19. Fronk is the owner of Secesh Engineering and is an Army Corps of Engineers
certified wetland delineator. Tr. 117:3-118:5. Over the past 20 years, he has evaluated over
200,000 acres of wetlands in Valley, Adams, and Ada Counties using the Clean Water Act
process and constructed approximately 100 acres of wetlands. Tr. 118:18-120:25.
Fronk conducted a wetland delineation of the property, prepared a soil analysis, and
monitored groundwater, among other activities, over the course of two years between 2007 and
2009. Tr. 123:25-124:25. Lake Cascade Airpark spent over $150,000 for that work. Tr. 103:1720. Fronk and representatives of the stakeholder agencies concluded that the property was "a
prime spot for a wetland bank." Tr. 125:5-13. That is largely because of the property's location
within a large drainage, its proximity to Cascade Reservoir, the prehistoric drainages that run to
the middle of the property, its high groundwater levels, and the ability of wetlands on the
property to be self-sustaining. Tr. 125:14-126:5, 127:6-17. Lake Cascade Airpark identified 283
acres on the east side of the property as suitable for development as a wetland mitigation bank.
See Tr. 91:9-16, 98:16-24.
3.

In May 2008, NFCS Appraised The Subject Property To Undenvrite Loans
And Found It Was Valued At $15,406 Per Acre Or $5,141,040.

In the meantime, Lake Cascade Airpark refinanced its loan on the subject property. On
May 27, 2008, it obtained a $2,450,000 teml10an and a $500,000 operating line of credit from
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NFCS. See Exs. (A) at 2-6, (D) at 14-16. The property secured the loans. See Exs. (B) at 7 -11,
(E) at 17-21. Before underwriting the loans, NFCS asked Susan Robbins, an appraiser employed
by NFCS, to appraise the property. Tr. 21: 1-8; Ex. (2) at 70. Robbins is a general appraiser
celiified in Idaho and Oregon and is also an accredited mral appraiser with the American Society
of Farm Managers and Rural Appraisers. Tr. 21 :25-22:6. She has never appraised property with
wetland mitigation bank credits available. Tr. 62:22-25.
On May 12, 2008, Robbins completed her appraisal report and found the subject
property, as a whole, was valued at $15,406 per acre or $5,141,040, with a marketing exposure
of six to 12 months. Ex. (2) at 72; Tr. 65:7-12. Robbins described the purpose of the report as
estimating the property's current market value in an "as in" condition, yet she also considered its
developmental potential. Ex. (2) at 72,78,86; Tr. 69:1-7. She recognized that any housing
developed on the property may be limited due to zoning constraints but also noted that the
"county, state and Bureau of Reclamation ... are in approval of this future development." Ex.
(2) at 78. She also found that "[t]he wet land mitigation bank may have some impact" on the
western side of the property. Ex. (2) at 81.
At trial, Robbins defended the values found in her 2008 appraisal, describing the market
at that time as "very active." Tr. 71:4-21. But her report does not support that assessment. Her
report acknowledges that the real estate market had stabilized in 2006, 2007, and 2008, with an
influx of properties listed for sale but no comparable sales in 2007 and 2008. Ex. (2) at 75, 82.
Further, she noted that Tamarack Resort, a resort directly across Cascade Reservoir from the
subject property-and the stimulus for an active real estate market in the area during 2004 and

774518025.60043308-00005

2005--declared bankruptcy months earlier in February 2008. Ex. (2) at 74-76. Robbins found
"[t]he market is prone for an adjustment in prices," even though the adjustment was yet unknown
due to the lack of sales in recent years. Ex. (2) at 75.
Nevertheless, based on the downward trend in the market, Robbins made adjustments in
valuing the property, while still recognizing and considering the developmental potential of the
property. She evaluated the property as two separate land components: (1) the west side of the
property, adjacent to the Cascade Airstrip, she considered reasonably developable as an airpark
(which she deemed "Site A") and (2) the remaining acreage on the east side of the property, she
considered a wetland area (which she deemed "Site B"). Ex. (2) at 81, 84-88; Tr. 65:13-66:15.
Because the property had two land components, she used a cost approach valuation method,
which "considers the land value based on comparable bare land sales comprised of similar land
classification." Ex. (2) at 81.
Robbins used nine comparable sales from 2003 to 2006: one from 2003, four from 2005,
and four from 2006. 4 Ex. (2) at 84-87. She found four of those sales comparable to Site A, with
sales ranging from $37,999 per acre to $63,650 per acre. s Ex. (2) at 87, 84-85. However, she

Robbins' report identifies nine comparable sales; however the fifth and ninth sales (of
156.92 acres, dated June 2005) are the same. See Ex. (2) at 84-85. In addition, the first sale is
dated August 2007, but Robbins noted that the sale "was negotiated in 2006 but closed in 2007."
Ex. (2) at 82. As a result, she considered the sale as one from 2006. Id.
4

5 Robbins identified "Sales #8, # 1, #2 and #4" as comparable sales to Site A. Ex. (2) at
87. Her reference to "Sale #8," however, is actually a reference to Sale #3. Compare Ex. (2) at
87 (referencing Sale #8 as $63,650 per acre), with Ex. (2) at 84 (referencing Sale #3 as $63,653
per acre).
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settled on a lower value of $32,000 per acre for Site A based on "the downward trend, the risk
involved in this property[,] as well as the development potential" of Site A. Ex. (2) at 87, 84.
With respect to Site B, Robbins found two comparable sales, each coming in at just over $7,900
per acre, and she rounded her appraisal to $8,000 per acre. 6 Id. Ultimately, she arrived at a
value of$15,406 per acre for the entire property or $5,141,040. Ex. (2) at 72,84.

4.

In May 2012, NFCS Reappraised The Subject Property As Part Of This
Action And Found It Was Valued At $4,001 Per Acre Or $1,335,000.

Two years later, Lake Cascade Airpark was unable to complete the process for
developing the wetland mitigation bank, due to financial difficulties facing the Buichs. Tr.
96: 18-97:7. The mitigation bank project went on hold at that time. See Tr. 97:3-9, 126:6-9. The
Buichs' financial problems also led Lake Cascade Airpark to fall behind on the loans. See Tr.
97:4-9. Lake Cascade Airpark's efforts to restructure the loans failed, Tr. 97:3-20, and NFCS
declared the loans in default and filed this foreclosure action on February 6,2012. Ex. (0) at 2425; R. 9-37. As part of the litigation, NFCS commissioned a second appraisal of the property on
May 30, 2012, again using its employee Robbins. See Ex. (lI) at 26; Tr. 27:21-23, 31:4-6.
Robbins' appraisal of the value of the property in 2012 is very different from her 2008
appraisal. While valuing the property at $15,406 per acre per acre in 2008, she found the
property's value had dropped to $4,001 per acre in 2012. See Ex. (lI) at 31; Tr. 32:5-9. Robbins
justified the reduction in value after finding the property's highest and best use was agricultural

6 Robbins identified "Sales #3 and #5" as more comparable to Site B. As just noted in
note 5, she mistakenly refelTed to Sale #3, meaning instead to reference Sale #8.
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use (i. e., "irrigated pasture land") with limited recreation influence and that the market for
agricultural land was very limited. Tr. 38:1-10, 39:5-9; Ex. (H) at 37, 39. She found there was
"little activity" in the real estate market in the area and 10 to 13 listings of property over 40 acres
had been on the market over 100 days. Tr. 30:4-17. That told her "[t]hat there is little interest in
the market right now. Few buyers, little interest." Tr. 30:16-17.
Finding few comparable sales in the market since 2008 and citing national and local
economic conditions, Robbins concluded the property was not suitable for development or to be
sold as development property. Ex. (H) at 33-34, 37, 39; Tr. 37:13-20. She refused to consider
the potential development of a wetland mitigation bank on the property, despite using a 12- to
24-month marketing time in reaching her valuation. Id.; see also Ex. (H) at 31. Robbins
testified that establishing a mitigation bank on the property was not feasible because she
understood the process was time-consuming and expensive. Tr. 37:21-25, 51 :5-52: 1. She also
testified that over 600,000 acres of wetlands already existed in Valley County, that those
wetlands could be purchased as credits, and that, in any event, she was not aware of a market for
the credits in Valley County. Tr. 53:19-54:12.
All of that led Robbins to evaluate the property as 333.63 acres of irrigated pasture land,
rather than as two separate land components, as she did in 2008. Ex. (H) at 39-43. Robbins also
chose not to use a cost valuation approach, reasoning "there are no improvements on this
property and one land class." Ex. (H) at 39; see also Tr. 32: 17-19. Instead, she used a sales
comparison valuation method, using 10 sales comparisons from 2004 to 2012: three from 2004,
two from 2005, and one from 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. See Ex. (H) at 39-41; Tr.
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32: 10-16. She found the reliability of that data "poor," Ex. (H) at 26; Tr. 58:23-59:2, and used
none of the comparable sales from her 2008 appraisal, compare Ex. (H) at 40-41, with Ex. (2) at
84-85. She concluded the property's value was $4,001 per acre or $1,335,000. Ex. (H) at 31.
5.

Lake Cascade Airpark And The Millers Presented Evidence Regarding The
Unique Setting And Attributes Of The Subject Property, Including The
Development Of A Wetland Mitigation Bank.

Appellant Donald Miller, representing Lake Cascade Airpark as well as his own interests,
also testified at trial. Miller has an extensive background in commercial development in Idaho
and elsewhere, as well as experience in environmental reclamation projects. Tr. 76:13-80:9.
Miller's familiarity with the subject property, which began in 1989, stemmed from its proximity
to the Cascade Airstrip and continued with his ownership of the property. Tr. 81:15-82:7, 84:1089:25. Miller testified that the property would be best utilized as a limited air park development
on its west side and as a wetland mitigation bank on its east side. Tr. 98:16-24. He testified that
given those attributes, the property should be valued as at least $4,500,000. Tr. 107:22-108: 17.
Miller also testified that little of the work already done on the wetland mitigation bank
proj ect would have to be redone. Tr. 101 :6-103 :25. According to Miller, the project could be
completed in no more than a year's time and eould be worth between $90,000 and $130,000 per
credit. See Tr. 104: 1-5, 104: 18-107:20. That testimony was substantiated by Fronk. According
to Fronk, the mitigation bank could be reintroduced to the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA,
using the same data that had already been developed. Tr. 126:17-127:5. All that is left to do is
update the site plan, obtain governmental approval, and develop the wetlands, which would take
between $50,000 and $75,000 and approximately one year to complete. See Tr. 132:4-133:25,
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127:24-128:21. And as already noted, once established, the mitigation credits are extremely
valuable in a market that already exists in Idaho. See Tr. 130: 18-131: 13, 134:5-16.
6.

The District Court Found NFCS's Valuation Of The Subject Property
Credible And Concluded The Reasonable Value Of The Property Was $4,500
Per Acre Or $1,501,500.

The day following trial, the district court entered its Partial Findings and Conclusions. R.
58-66. The district court found the property had "a significant wetland component," and that
while the wetland mitigation bank had not been completed, "[i]t is undisputed that part of the
property has future potential as a source of wetland mitigation." R. 61. Despite that, the district
court accepted Robbins' finding that "the property's former recreational and developmental
potential had disappeared by 2012; its current highest and best use was agricultural." R.63-64.
In the end, the district court found that NFCS's valuation was "more in touch with the reality of
the marketplace" and that "Mr. Miller's opinion has a large component of wishful thinking .... "
R. 64. Even so, the district court also found Robbins' appraisal "a bit on the low side." Id. The
court concluded that the "property in its current condition and in the current market has a
reasonable or fair market value of$4,500 per acre or $1,501,335, rounded to $1,501,500.00, as
of September 25, 2012." Id.
The district court sustained those findings when denying Lake Cascade Airpark and the
Millers' motions to amend the findings and judgment under Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) and
for a new trial under Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). R. 393-403. With respect to the motions to
amend, the district court reiterated its belief that "[b]y September 2012 [the property] was
valuable only as farm or ranch land, regardless of any hope that the property might again become
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ripe for vacation or residential development at some indefinite future date or that it eventually
might have additional value if wetland credits actually were established." R. 398. For similar .
reasons, the district court denied the motion for a new trial. R. 400-02. The court found its
"original decision was in accord with the law, the facts, the right, and the justice of the case,"
emphasizing its opportunity to consider the evidence presented at trial and ability to reweigh that
evidence. R. 402 ("[A] retrial would not produce a different result.").

II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court commit clear error in finding the subject property was

valuable only as agricultural land and that the property's reasonable value was no more than
$4,500 per acre or $1,501,500?
2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants' motions to

amend and their motion for a new tdal?

III. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL
Appellants seek costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LA.R. 40 and Idaho Code §
12-120(3), respectively, for the reasons stated below in Section V.C of this brief.

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL
As Appellants, Lake Cascade Airpark and the Millers acknowledge they face a standard
of review that is significantly deferential. When the trial court is the trier of fact, as here, its
findings of fact will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered. Lindgren
v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854, 857, 949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997). This Court cannot set aside a trial

court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a); Kennedy v.
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Schneider, 151 Idaho 440, 442, 259 P .3d 586, 588 (2011). Factual findings are not clearly
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence.

Kennedy, 151 Idaho at 442,259 P.3d at 588. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact
would accept it and rely on it to determine a disputed point of fact. PacifiCorp. v. Idaho State

Tax Comm 'n, 153 Idaho 759, 768, 291 P.3d 442, 451 (2012). It has also been said that a finding
of fact becomes clearly erroneous when, after reviewing the entire record, the reviewing court is
left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. State v. Roe, 139 Idaho
18,21,72 P.3d 858,861 (2003).
A trial court's decisions on a motion to amend findings or a judgment under Idaho R.
Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) and a motion for a new trial under Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6) are treated
similarly. The Court reviews a decision to deny a motion to amend under an abuse of discretion
standard and will not disturb that decision where substantial and competent evidence supports
the trial court's findings. BeL<;tler v. Sheler, 151 Idaho 819, 823, 264 P.3d 926,930 (2011). A
decision to deny a new trial is also reviewed for abuse of discretion and will not be disturbed
absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486,497-98,943
P.2d 912, 923-24 (1997). The test for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion
involves three inquiries: (1) whether the court recognized the issue as discretionary; (2) whether
the court acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision
through an exercise of reason. Id. at 498, 943 P.2d at 924.
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v.

ARGUMENT

Under Idaho law, a deficiency judgment may be obtained if a foreclosure sale does not
satisfy the debt. See Idaho Code § 6-108. In that situation, the amount of the deficiency is
limited to the difference between the amount of the unpaid debt and the reasonable value of the
real property. Id. The statute further requires the district court to take necessary evidence to
determine the property's reasonable value. See id.; E. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Placerton,

Inc., 100 Idaho 863,869,606 P.2d 967, 973 (1980). The goal of that exercise is to prohibit the
mortgagee from obtaining a windfall should it purchase the property at less than its actual value.
E. Idaho Prod. Credit, 100 Idaho at 869, 606 P.2d at 973. The mortgagee should not be allowed

to get "something more than a full recovery ... at the expense of the mortgagor." Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
A.

The District Court Committed Clear Error Finding The Property Was Valued At
$4,500 Per Acre Or $1,501,500.

1.

Substantial Evidence Does Not Support The Finding That The Property Was
Valuable Only As Agricultural Grazing Land.

The district court allowed NFCS "something more than a full recovery" when it found the
property was developable in 2012 only as agricultural land and thus valued at no more than
$4,500 per acre or $1,501,500. Because those findings are not supported by substantial
evidence, they amount to clear error. As found by the district court, the valuation given by
Robbins was "more credible" than the evidence presented by Appellants. R. 64. The district
court accepted Robbins' conclusion that the property's "developmental potential had disappeared
by 2012," that "its current highest and best use was agricultural," and that, as a starting point, its
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value was $4,001 per acre. See R. 63-64. Indeed, the district court concluded that Robbins'
"appraisal appears to bc much more in touch with the reality of the marketplace," R. 64, and later
elaborated that the property "was valuable only as farm or ranch land," R. 398.
This Court owes no deference to those findings if they are not supported by substantial
evidence. Kennedy, 151 Idaho at 442, 259 P.3d at 588. In Kennedy, the Court applied that
principle when it reversed a trial court's finding that the plaintiffs proved a claim of adverse
possession. Id. at 445-46, 259 P.3d at 591-92. The trial court found the plaintiffs had proven
they paid taxes on the disputed property, one of the elements of adverse possession. Id. at 441,
259 P.3d at 587. On appeal, the Court "carefully examine [d] the testimony upon which the
district court based its factual finding that the [plaintiffs] actually paid taxes on the disputed
parcel." Id. at 445,259 P.3d at 591. After reviewing the record closely, the Court determined
the trial court's finding was not supported by substantial evidence and was thus clearly
erroneous. Id. at 445-46,259 P.3d at 591-92.
Like in Kennedy, a review of the record here shows the district court's finding that the
property was valuable only as agricultural land is not supported by substantial evidence. After
finding the east side of the property had some value as a wetland mitigation bank-and
evaluating it as such-in 2008, see Ex. (2) at 81, four years later the same appraiser reversed
course when the property was in foreclosure, see Ex. (H) at 37, 39. Despite the fact that little
had changed with respect to the development of a mitigation bank on the property, Robbins
found the property was no longer feasible for such a use. See id. In particular, Robbins made
assumptions regarding the feasibility of a wetland mitigation bank on the property that were
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plainly wrong. Having no experience appraising property with mitigation credits available, Tr.
62:22-25, Robbins had no direct knowledge of compensatory mitigation under the Clean Water
Act and wetland mitigation banks. Instead, she relied on conversations with two other
appraisers, neither of whom testified at trial. Tr. 56: 14-24, 63: 12-19.
But assumptions she made based on those conversations were not supported by
substantial evidence. To start, Robbins was clearly mistaken when she assumed that 600,000
acres of existing wetlands in Valley County would compete with a wetland mitigation bank on
the property. See Tr. 53:22-54:12. Existing wetlands, in and of themselves, are not eligible for
inclusion in a mitigation bank under Clean Water Act regulations. See Tr. 122:7-22. Only
wetlands that are established, restored, enhanced, or preserved can qualify for credits. 40 C.F .R.

§ 230.92 (defining "compensatory mitigation" and "mitigation bank"); 33 C.F.R. § 332.2 (same).
It follows that the existing wetlands in Valley County would increase the demand for a wetland

mitigation bank on the property-because impacts to those wetlands require compensatory
mitigation under the Clean Water Act and thus the purchase of credits from a mitigation bank to
offset such impacts. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 230.93(b)(2), 230.98; 33 C.F.R. §§ 332.3(b)(2), 332.8.
Further, only four wetland mitigation banks have been developed in Idaho. Tr. 131:6-13.
The undisputed evidence also showed that the subject property is uniquely situated for
the establishment of new wetlands and a wetland mitigation bank. It was lTD, a customer of
mitigation credits, that first approached Lake Cascade Airpark about the possibility of
developing a mitigation bank on the property in 2006. Tr. 98:1-5. lTD's interest in the property
was later borne out by Fronk's wetland delineation of the property. Fronk, whose experience
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with wetland mitigation banking unquestionably eclipses Robbins', concluded the property is "a
prime spot for a wetland bank" given its unique natural attributes-e.g., its location within a
large drainage, its high groundwater levels, and its prehistoric drainages. Tr. 125 :5-126:5, 127:617. Agency representatives agreed with that conclusion. Tr. 125:5-13.
Robbins' assumptions about the expense and time involved to complete development of a
mitigation wetland bank on the property were also proven wrong. See Tr. 57:6-25,63:20-64:2.
According to Fronk, the wetlands mitigation project could be reintroduced to the Army Corps of
Engineers and EPA, using the same data that had already been developed. Tr. 126:6-127:5,
132:4-133:25. All that is left to do is update the site plan, obtain governmental approval, and
build the wetlands. Tr. 132:4-133:25. Fronk testified that it would take between $50,000 and
$75,000 and approximately one year to complete the project, Tr. 127:24-128:21, well within
Robbins' 12- to 24-month marketing period for the property, see Ex. (H) at 31.
Fronk also explained, again contrary to Robbins' assumptions, see Tr. 53:19-21, that a
market for the wetland credits already exists in Idaho and is not limited to just Valley County but
would be positioned for sale within a service area that includes the Payette River, Weiser River,
and Boise River drainages. 7 Tr. 130: 18-131: 13, 134:5-16. And once established, the credits are
extremely valuable. As noted, the evidence showed that lTD had recently purchased credits for
emergent wetlands at approximately $25,000 per tenth of an acre, while the City of Boise had

7 That service area thus encompasses large developable areas of Valley, Boise, Gem,
Washington, and Payette Counties.
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purchased mitigation credits for $4.50 per square foot or approximately $180,000 per acre. Tr.
130:18-131 :5,106:17-107:20. That evidence was not refuted at trial.
Based on full record, the Court should be left with a definite and firm conviction that the
subject property must be valued as a wetland mitigation bank, and not as agricultural grazing
land. Assumptions made by NFCS that a wetland mitigation bank was not feasible on the
property were clearly wrong. Such evidence cannot both be substantial and plainly wrong. To
reach that conclusion, the Court has no need to assess the competency of Robbins' findings or
reweigh the evidence as in PacijiCorp., 153 Idaho at 768, 291 P .3d at 451.

In PacijiCorp, the Idaho State Tax Commission appealed the district court's valuation of an
electric utility's taxable operating property. Id. at 760-61,291 P.3d at 443-44. The district court
had rejected the Commission's valuation approach and accepted the utility's approach. Id. at
766,291 P.3d at 449. On appeal, the Court rejected the Commission's argument that the utility's
valuation methods were incompetent and unreliable, finding substantial evidence to support
those methods. !d. at 767-73,291 P.3d at 450-56.
That is not the situation in this case. Appellants do not challenge the district court's
assessment of Robbins' competency or her valuation methods. Instead, they challenge the
evidence supporting the district court's finding that the property can only be valued as
agricultural land. As Kennedy shows, a careful review of the record can demonstrate that a
district court's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. 151 Idaho at 445-46, 259 P.3d
at 591-92. Where so, such findings are clearly erroneous and subject to reversal. See id. Here
the evidence supporting the district court's valuation of the property was not substantial, for it

- 19 74518025.60043308-00005

was based on mistaken assumptions regarding the feasibility of a wetland mitigation bank. For
those reasons, Appellants respectfully ask the COUli to reverse the district court and remand this
matter for further proceedings on the value of the subject property.
2.

Appellants vVere Prejudiced By The District Court's Finding That The
Property Is Reasonably Valued As Mere Agricultural Land At No More
Than $1,501,500.

This Court will not reverse the district court if an alleged error is harmless. See Idaho R.
Civ. P. 61. The error alleged here is not harmless. In the face of substantial evidence that the
subject property is uniquely suited for development as a wetland mitigation bank, it was clearly
wrong for the district court to find the property was valuable only as agricultural land. Yet, on
that basis, the district court found the property was valued at no more than $4,500 per acre or
$1,501,500 and then set the deficiency judgment owed by Appellants as $2,105,986.16, plus
interest. Had the district court properly considered the evidence regarding the property's value
as a wetland mitigation bank, the deficiency would have been much less, if not completely
extinguished. The record shows the value of the property as a wetland mitigation bank was
worth over $90,000 per credit. SeeTr.130:18-131:13, 134:5-16, 104:1-107:20. That value far
exceeds the district court's valuation of$4,500 per acre. The prejudice to Appellants is therefore
readily apparent.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Refused To Amend Its Findings
And Grant A New Trial On The Reasonable Value Of The Property.
Because the district court clearly erred when it found the subject property's only value

was as agricultural land, the district court also abused its discretion when it denied Appellants'
motions to amend the findings and conclusions pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(b) and 59(e) and
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motion for a new trial pursuant to Idaho R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6). A decision on a motion to amend
must be evaluated to detern1ine if substantial and competent evidence supports the trial court's
findings. Belstler, 151 Idaho at 823, 264 P.3d at 930. Similarly, when a motion for a new trial is
based on insufficient evidence to justify the verdict, the trial court must weigh the evidence
presented at trial and grant the motion only where the verdict is not in accord with its assessment
of the clear weight of the evidence. Lanham, 130 Idaho at 498,943 P.2d at 924.
Here, the district court recognized the discretion it is afforded in deciding motions to
amend and for a new trial. R. 393-403. But as explained above, the district court's finding that
the property should be valued only as agricultural land, because a wetland mitigation bank was
not feasible, was not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, the clear weight of the evidence
showed otherwise: the property is uniquely suited for the development of over 200 acres as a
wetland mitigation bank at values in excess of $90,000 per credit and potentially much more.

r or that reason, the district court acted outside the bounds of its discretion and did not reach its
decision through an exercise of reason.
Because substantial evidence does not support the district court's findings, the court
abused its discretion in refusing to amend its findings and conclusions and to grant a new trial.
For that reason too, the district court's valuation of the property must be reversed and remanded.
C.

If They Prevail, Appellants Are Entitled To Costs And Attorney Fees On Appeal.

If Appellants are the prevailing parties in this appeal, they seek costs on appeal pursuant
to LA.R. 40. Appellants also seek their attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 12120(3), which provides for the recovery of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action
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involving a commercial transaction. As set forth above, the evidence at trial showed that
Appellants purchased the subject property for commercial purposes, not for personal or
household purposes. As such, if Appellants prevail, they are entitled to attorney fees under
Section 12-120(3). See Am. Pension Servs., Inc.

v.

Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147 Idaho

638,644,213 P.3d 1038, 1044 (2009) (awarding attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Section 12120(3) when action involved commercial transaction).

VI. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Appellants respectfully request the Court reverse the
district court's order finding the subject property was valuable only as agricultural land and that
the property's reasonable value was no more than $4,500 per acre or $1,501,500 and remand this
matter to the district court for further proceedings. Appellants also request that the Court award
them costs and attorney fees as the prevailing parties on appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of October, 2013.
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